The long run effects of changes in tax progressivity by Daniel R. Carroll & Eric R. Young
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
09  13
The Long Run Effects of Changes in 
Tax Progressivity
by Daniel R. Carroll and Eric R. YoungWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the 
formal editorial review accorded ofﬁ  cial Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated 
herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World Wide Web: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research.Working Paper 09-13 December 2009
The Long Run Effects of Changes in Tax Progressivity
by Daniel R. Carroll and Eric R. Young
This paper compares the steady state outcomes of revenue-neutral changes to the 
progressivity of the tax schedule. Our economy features heterogeneous house-
holds who differ in their preferences and permanent labor productivities, but it 
does not have idiosyncratic risk. We ﬁ  nd that increases in the progressivity of 
the tax schedule are associated with long-run distributions with greater aggre-
gate income, wealth, and labor input. Average hours generally declines as the 
tax schedule becomes more progressive implying that the economy substitutes 
away from less productive workers toward more productive workers. Finally, as 
progressivity increases, income inequality is reduced and wealth inequality rises. 
Many of these results are qualitatively different than those found in models with 
idiosyncratic risk, and therefore suggest closer attention should be paid to model-
ing the insurance opportunities of households.
Key words: heterogeneity, progressive taxation, complete markets.
JEL codes: E21, E25, E62
Daniel R. Carroll is at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and can be reached 
at dcarroll@clev.frb.org. Eric R. Young is at the University of Virginia and can be 
reached at ey2d@virginia.edu.1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀects of ﬂattening progressive tax functions when markets
for insurance are complete. The literature on the gains from ﬂattening the tax code is large –
some recent quantitative examples include Ventura (1999), Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-
Rull (1999), D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez and Pijoan-Mas (2006), Conesa and Krueger (2006), and Conesa, Kitao,
and Krueger (2008). All of these papers begin with the presumption that insurance markets are
absent (as in Aiyagari 1994); progressive taxation therefore has beneﬁcial insurance properties, as
it reduces the variance of labor income.1 It turns out that a robust prediction of these models is
that aggregate activity and welfare respond positively to ”ﬂattening” the tax code. In contrast,
we approach the problem from the other end of the spectrum – we ask how progressive tax reform
would eﬀect the economy in a model without any uncertainty where inequality is entirely due to
immutable heterogeneity in preferences and endowments.
Constructing a model that matches the US distributions of income and wealth not based on
idiosyncratic risk is diﬃcult given the results we found in Carroll and Young (2009). In the absence
of discount factor heterogeneity, deterministic models with progressive taxation predict that the
stationary distribution will have a negative correlation between income and wealth and between
capital and labor income, both of which are inconsistent with US data.2 To get around these
problems, we construct distributions of discount factors, labor productivities, and labor supply
disutilities that exactly match the distributions of assets, income, and labor hours in the model to
those in the data. We use this model to investigate the response of the economy to changes in the
progressivity of the income tax code.3
1Meh (2005) considers how progressive taxation aﬀects the economy in a world with risky saving via entrepreneurial
activity.
2Elastic labor supply and/or borrowing constraints do not aﬀect those results.
3Saez (2002) uses a similar model in which the only heterogeneity is in initial wealth.
1The qualitative and quantitative implications of tax reforms in our model are quite diﬀerent
than those in the incomplete market literature. We conduct three revenue-neutral tax reform
experiments and ﬁnd that ﬂattening the tax code – reducing the progressivity of the income tax
– tends to reduce aggregate capital and labor input, rather than increase it; the decrease is also
quantitatively large. More progressive marginal tax schedules can lead to steady states with
as much as 47% and 40% greater aggregate capital and labor input, respectively. The results
of our other experiments, though less pronounced, consistently ﬁnd that tax reforms with more
progressive schedules have increase aggregate capital and labor input. We also ﬁnd that increased
progressivity generally decreases income inequality and increases wealth inequality. These changes
occur without any change in the average tax rate in the economy, since we impose revenue neutrality
on our experiments. With respect to labor input, progressivity increases labor input because it
reallocates labor from less productive to more productive agents, generating output gains even
though labor supply – measured by raw hours – actually declines.
Our results have two implications. First, endogenizing the extent to which the private sector
can provide insurance – as in Krueger and Perri (2005) or ´ Abrah´ am and Carceles-Poveda (2007)
– may be critical for understanding whether progressive taxation increases or decreases aggregate
activity. Second, the extent to which inequality is driven by preferences vs. endowments also will
play a role in determining the eﬀects of progressive taxation, as they do in determining the eﬀects
of eliminating the business cycle (see Krusell et al. 2009).
2. Model
The model economy is composed of three sectors: a stand-in ﬁrm, a government, and a collection
of heterogeneous households.
22.1. Households
The economy is populated by an inﬁnite set I of households of unit measure. These households
diﬀer ex ante along three dimensions: their discount factor β, their permanent labor productivity
ε, and their disutility from labor B. Every household is endowed with 1 unit of discretionary
time which it may allocate to leisure, ℓ, or labor, h. Any household i ∈ I has preferences over













σ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of leisure and is assumed uniform across households.4
While we do not focus on sustained growth, the utility function is consistent with a balanced-growth
path along which leisure and labor supply are constant.
2.2. Firm
Each period, a stand-in ﬁrm uses capital and labor input to produce output according to a pro-
duction technology F (K,N). Let F (K,N) be strictly concave and increasing in K and N and
F (0,N) = F (K,0) = 0. Output may be consumed or invested toward future capital. The ﬁrm
rents inputs from the households through perfectly competitive markets. Letting the production
technology be Cobb-Douglas with capital share parameter α ∈ [0,1], proﬁt-maximization implies
that each input is paid its marginal product so
rt = F1 (K,N) = αKα−1N1−α
wt = F2 (K,N) = (1 − α)KαN−α.
4We can match the same distributions if we assume heterogeneity in σ and homogeneity in B.
3We assume that each period the stock of capital depreciates by a factor δ ∈ [0,1].
2.3. Government
Each period, the government collects revenue from a tax on income, τ (y) and purchases Gt goods
which do not enter the households’ utility functions. Let τ′ (y) : R+ → [0,1) be continuous
and monotone increasing. Let Γ(i) be the density of agents over types i. Any surplus revenue




τ (yit)Γ(i)di − Gt (2.2)
is satisﬁed each period. We abstract from the presence of government debt.
2.4. Equilibrium
Each household i maximizes (2.1) by choice of consumption, leisure, and savings, ki,t+1, while
respecting its budget and time constraint
cit + ki,t+1 = yit − τ (yit) + Tt + kit (2.3)
ℓit + hit ≤ 1 (2.4)
where
yit = wtεihit + (rt − δ)kit (2.5)
is household income. Given the behavior of the ﬁrm and the government and a population density









t=0, and government policies {Gt,Tt}
∞
t=0 such that for any t ∈ {0,1,...}
1. For every i ∈ I, {ci,ℓi,ki} maximizes (2.1).















+ Gt = F (Kt,Nt) + (1 − δ)Kt.
4. At {Gt,Tt} the government’s budget is balanced.
The household’s optimization problem has a continuous, concave objective function and a com-
pact and convex constraint set. Along with (2.3) and a transversality condition for each i ∈ I, the
















1 − τ′ (yit)
 
wtεi − Bi (1 − hit)
−σ ; (2.7)
if hit > 0 then the second condition is an equality.
52.5. Steady State














1 − τ′ (yi)
 
wεi − Bi (1 − hi)
−σ with eq. if hi > 0 (2.9)
ci = yi − τ (yi) + T (2.10)
yi = wεihi + (r − δ)ki. (2.11)
For a given rental rate, (2.8) pins down the long-run marginal tax rate for each household. Since
τ′ (y) is strictly increasing, each marginal tax rate is associated with a unique level of income, and
(2.8) identiﬁes the long-run distribution of income. Given τ′ (y), household i’s long-run income is

















Note the following properties of θ: ∂θ
∂β > 0, ∂θ
∂r > 0, and ∂θ
∂τ′ < 0.
Because for a given tax function and transfer, a household’s steady state consumption depends
only upon its income, the hours supplied by a household can be expressed as a function of its
























[1 − τ′ (θ (βi,r;τ′))]w
=









6Hours have not been expressed as a function of the wage because equilibrium w can be written as
a function of r and α under the assumptions about F. Note that what matters for hours is not
productivity per se, but rather productivity relative to the disutility parameter.

















The level of productivity plays a role in determining the asset holdings of each household.
2.5.1. The role of household characteristics on steady state income, wealth, and hours
Holding market prices and government policy ﬁxed, we now examine how long run income, wealth
and hours are aﬀected by βi, εi, and Bi.
• The Discount Factor: Given market prices, βi identiﬁes long run income yi. Larger β

















































More patient households will save more and work less, all other things equal.
• Labor Productivity: In the steady state, income is independent of ε, and therefore so is






















so hours rise with ε and wealth declines.
• Disutility of Labor: As one would expect, increases in B decrease steady state hours and
increase steady state wealth.
• Frisch Elasticity: The parameter σ (the reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity) only aﬀects the
sensitivity of the responses of hours and wealth, not the direction. As σ → ∞, h∗ → 1, so
that hours and wealth are unresponsive to changes in either parameters or prices.
2.5.2. The response of steady state income, wealth, and hours to changes in prices and
ﬁscal policy
To better understand our numerical results, it is helpful to do some partial equilibrium comparative
statics on the steady state.
• Increase in τ (yi) (or a decrease in T):
Holding prices ﬁxed, an increase in τ (yi) (or a decline in T) does not aﬀect long run income;
Ai falls. Hours weakly rise for each household not at the lower bound on hours after the Ai
decrease.5 Wealth moves in the opposite direction as hours so it weakly falls.
• Increase in τ′ (yi):
5For these households, the multiplier on the hours constraint is less binding after the tax change.
8If the marginal tax rate rises, then according to (2.8) yi falls. For households with discount
factors not less than 1







































where the second equality is true because
∂τ
∂θ




by (2.12). Less patient households will already be converging to the natural borrowing limit
where hours approach 1. Decreasing the return to savings by increasing their marginal tax
rate will not induce them to reverse their behavior. Therefore as long as β is suﬃciently
large, steady state wealth decreases with τ′.6
• Increase in r (decrease in w): An increase in the steady state rental rate (or equivalently
a decline in the aggregate wage) leads to a rise in income for every household. The size of this
increase for any given household will depend upon what part of the marginal tax function the
household faces. In order for (2.8) to be satisﬁed, for any household i the after-tax return
on savings in the new steady state must be equal to what it was in the initial steady state.
Therefore an r increase must be oﬀset by an increase in τ′ (yi) (i.e., yi must increase). If a
6In our experiments no household has a β less than
1
1+r−δ.
9particular household is in a region of the marginal tax function where its derivative is near
zero (near the upper bound), then a large increase in yi will be necessary to satisfy (2.8). On
the other hand if the derivative is large, then only a small increase in yi will restore equality
in (2.8). Therefore, an increase in r will tend to increase income inequality. In addition, the
long run response of hours is negative and therefore that of wealth is positive.
3. Numerical Experiments
In order to ﬁnd quantitative results for the model, we conduct a series of revenue neutral tax
experiments. We select the following functional form for each household’s tax bill:









The ﬁrst term is the functional form Gouveia and Strauss (1994) assumed to estimate the eﬀective
personal income tax function using 1989 US tax return data.7 The second term, ν3y, captures
other tax revenues that are not modeled but are paid by households in the data (e.g., excise taxes,
estate taxes, property taxes). In the interest of focusing on the progressivity of the personal income
tax, the combined eﬀect of these other taxes is assumed to be a linear function of income. ν0 sets
the upper bound on the marginal personal income tax rate. The highest possible value of τ′ (y)
then is ν0 + ν3. ν1 changes the curvature of the function. The exact way in which it does so
will be clear after the ﬁrst experiment. Finally ν2 adjusts τ (y) for the unit of measure of income.
Throughout all experiments its value remains ﬁxed. It is important to remember that because
of revenue neutrality, the average tax rate is unchanged across experiments. The wide range of
7This functional form has been used in a number of quantitative studies of progressive taxation, including
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull (1999), Conesa and Krueger (2006), and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger
(2008). An alternative smooth speciﬁcation is used in Sarte (1997), Li and Sarte (2003), and Carroll (2009), while
a more detailed nonsmooth function is used in Ventura (1999).
10steady state distributions and of their corresponding moments strongly suggests that ignoring the
distributional eﬀects of tax changes may not be innocuous.
3.1. Calibration
To initialize the model, we calibrate to income, wealth, hours, and analysis weight data from the
Survey of Consumer Finances 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004. The total number of households
used for the experiment is 15,437. After deﬂating these data by the 1992 GDP deﬂator, we
normalize aggregate income to 1, wealth to 3, and hours to 0.33. We set α = 0.36 and σ = 2.
Government spending is 20 percent of aggregate income and transfers are 10 percent. We also ﬁx
ν0 and ν1 to 0.258 and 0.768 from Gouveia and Strauss (1994). We set the remaining parameters
so that the steady state of our model matches speciﬁc aggregate statistics at the annual frequency.
ν3 = 0.0855 which implies that 71.5% of tax revenue is raised through the progressive personal
income tax.8 Depreciation is set to δ = 0.05 so that investment is 15 percent of income. ψi for




{βi,εi,Bi}, r, and ν2 are solved for jointly. The preference parameters are backed out from the
ﬁrst-order conditions and deﬁnition of income for each household. A diﬃculty with this method
arises when a survey household works zero hours. Because the intratemporal condition is not
binding there are inﬁnitely many possible solutions to the system. Speciﬁcally, it is impossible to
back out εi and Bi directly. To address this problem, we ﬁrst solve for the household characteristics
of working households and regress in logs εi on age, education, and race (reported in the survey).
In addition, we construct the cdf of B. Then if we encounter a non-working household, we use its
8This is the average fraction of tax revenue from personal income taxes for the years 1992 − 2004. Our measure
is taken from the Oﬃce of Management and Budget Historical Table 2.2. We do not include Social Insurance and
Retirement Receipts in our calculation, so we exclude FICA taxes.
11reported age, education, and race along with the regression equation to get a predicted εi. Given
εi, we ﬁnd Bi,min for which the intratemporal condition just binds. To select a Bi we draw from
the cdf of B truncated below at Bi,min. Finally, r and ν2 are adjusted to clear the market for
capital goods and the government budget constraint.
3.1.1. A note on the measurement of tax progressivity
We now discuss the notion of progressivity. It is not clear exactly how to characterize a tax
change as ”progressive” or ”regressive” when the underlying distribution of income changes. As a
result, it is not straightforward to compare the progressiveness of two tax functions and so there
are several methods used in the literature, and these measures may not agree on the ranking of
tax schedules. We choose to report the Kakwani (1977) index which is the tax Gini coeﬃcient
minus the income Gini coeﬃcient. A higher value of the index corresponds to greater progressivity.
This index is particularly well-suited to our problem because the income distribution is not ﬁxed
in our experiments. To see this, suppose two tax functions, τA and τB, are associated with two
diﬀerent steady state income distributions ΓA and ΓB, and without loss of generality assume that
GτA > GτB, where Gτi is the Gini coeﬃcient of the tax burden in the steady state resulting from
τi. In words, the tax burden in steady state A is more unequal than it is in B. Now there are two
possible reasons for why this may be the case. First, τA may simply place higher average tax rates
on high income households than τB. Alternatively, ΓA may have a greater fraction of high income
households than ΓB so that most of the tax burden rests with these high income households (even
if their average rate is lower than under τB). The Kakwani index corrects for these diﬀerences in
income inequality.
In Tables 2, 4, and 6, we report the Gini coeﬃcients of income and of wealth as well as two
Kakwani index calculations. Because it is not certain that a tax change which seems more pro-
12gressive initially will end up being more progressive in resulting steady state, we give two Kakwani
index measures. Kakpre measures the Kakwani index of the tax change using the initial income
distribution, while Kakpost measures the index on the long run distribution of income. In our ex-
periments, the direction of progressivity never reverses (i.e., the ordering of tax reforms according
to progressivity resulting from Kakpre is preserved under Kakpost). Nevertheless, in most cases
the degree of progressivity is signiﬁcantly diminished in the long run as households respond to the
new tax code. Kakpost > Kakpre in only the ﬁnal experiment, and this occurs because the Gini
coeﬃcient of the tax burden hits its upper bound of 1 while income inequality increases in the new
steady state.
3.1.2. Experiment 1: Increase in the Curvature of the Personal Income Tax
In this experiment we increase the value of v1 and adjust ν3 to balance the government budget
constraint. v1 alters the degree of progressivity of the tax function: when v1 = 0 the personal
income tax is ﬂat, but when ν1 > 0, average tax rates and marginal tax rates rise with income.
Figure 1 displays the marginal personal income tax function for several ν1 values in the range
explored in the experiment. A higher ν1 reduces the marginal tax rate on low incomes and induces
a more rapid rise to the highest rate, ν0.9 This ﬁgure, however, does not account for revenue
neutrality’s eﬀect on the total tax bill. Figure 2 shows the marginal tax bill function which reﬂects
the changes both in ν1 and ν3. When revenue neutrality is imposed it is not immediately clear
which tax is more progressive. A ν1 of 0.768 places a higher total marginal tax rate on low income
than greater ν1 values do. Compared to a value of 2.0, ν1 = 3.0 leads to higher marginal tax rates
on high income households as one would expect, but it also imposes higher rates on the very poor.
Turning to the eﬀects of tax policy changes on the long-run levels of aggregate variables. We
9In the limit as ν1 → ∞, the marginal tax function approaches a ﬂat tax with an exemption at low income levels.
See Conesa and Krueger (2006).
13report the percentage changes in the aggregates in Table 1. ν1 has a hump-shaped relationship
with income, capital, labor input, and wages. Figure 3 plots the steady state levels of aggregate
income, capital and consumption over ν1. All three exhibit dramatic responses to changes in ν1.
For example, increasing ν1 from 0.768 to 2.0 causes aggregate wealth to increase by 46.8 percent.
Even at the highest value of ν1, capital is still 43 percent above the baseline level. Responses
in the labor market are plotted in Figure 4, average hours decline by as much as 29.4 percent
meaning that higher progressivity in the personal income tax causes a substitution in production
from less-productive to more-productive households. Interestingly, this pattern persists at high
values of ν1 even though the average wage falls sharply in this region. The large increase in labor
input comes from the upper 4 percent of productive households. Figures 5 and 6 plot the average
hours within each percentile of the ε-distribution for the baseline and ν1 = 2.0 cases. Notice that
hours fall for nearly the entire economy, however, they rise somewhat at the upper end. Clearly
average hours fall, but the impact on labor input of the upper 4 percent is much more signiﬁcant.
To make this more pronounced, we plot the average labor input within each percentile of ε. This
is shown in Figures 7 and 8. Now the diﬀerence at the upper tail is starkly apparent, especially in
the top 1 percent.
One advantage of the modeling technique used here is the ability to characterize behavior at
the extremes of the income and wealth distributions. Figures 9 and 10 show the breakdown in
income, wealth and consumption across the steady state distribution for some values of ν1. There
are several conclusions that can be made about ν1 increases. First, increasing ν1 reduces income
inequality. The Gini coeﬃcient of income is cut by more than 50 percent when ν1 increases from
its baseline to 3.0. In general this is caused because low and middle-income households marginal
total tax rates are reduced the most. Nevertheless, not all high income households reduce their
income. Finally, the interest rate is lower in the ν1 = 3.0 steady state. As discussed previously,
14this leads to lower income inequality. Wealth inequality, on the other hand, increases. Plots of
the income, wealth, and tax burden Gini coeﬃcients across steady states is shown in Figure 11.
3.1.3. Experiment 2: Shift between Personal Income Taxation and other Tax Sources
This experiment increases the fraction of tax revenue raised with the progressive income tax rel-
ative to the ﬂat tax by increasing ν0 and reducing ν3. Figures 12 and 13 compare the baseline
marginal personal income tax functions and marginal tax bill functions for several values of ν0 in
the experiment.10 As ν0 increases the marginal personal tax function rotates upward, however
the marginal total tax function rotates downward which is consistent with our ﬁnding from the
previous experiment that higher progressivity is associated with more aggregate activity. In fact,
in the steady state where ν3 = 0, aggregate income is 11.6 percent larger and the capital stock
is 14.5 percent larger than in the baseline case. Percent changes for all aggregates are displayed
in Table 3. In ﬁgures 14 and 15, the steady state values of the economy’s aggregates are plotted
for the whole range of ν0 in the experiment. There is basically a linear relationship between ν0
and the aggregate variables. As in experiment 1 (though to a lesser degree), average hours falls
and total labor input rises so once again more progressivity is eﬀecting a substitution from less
productive workers to more productive workers.
The qualitative results for inequality are also similar to those from experiment 1. Figure 16
plots the steady state Gini coeﬃcients of income, wealth, and taxes. The income Gini falls slightly
as the total tax schedule tilts towards the progressive income tax schedule. In contrast, wealth
inequality rises signiﬁcantly (roughly 16%). In this case, the large increase in wealth inequality
comes primarily from large negative asset positions taken by moderately patient households with
very high labor productivity.
10At ν0 = 0.32, ν3 ≈ 0.
153.1.4. Experiment 3: Flat Tax with an Exemption
In our ﬁnal experiment, we consider a tax function like that from Conesa and Krueger (2006) who
ﬁnd that the optimal progressive income tax combines a ﬂat tax with an exemption level for income.
In our case, this is approximated by letting ν1 → ∞. In keeping with that paper we eliminate the
linear schedule (i.e., ν3 = 0) and adjust ν0 to balance the government’s budget. There are two
marginal tax rates under this system – one is zero and the other is τ = ν0, with a level of income
y = 1 that determines the switch.11 Incomes above ¯ y pay a tax bill ¯ τ ∗ ¯ y, while incomes below ¯ y
pay nothing.
Proposition 3.1. Given the tax function described above and a set of types each with a discount
factor from {β1,β2,...,βN} where 1 > β1 > β2 > ... > βN > 0, in any steady state with positive
government expenditures
β2 ≤
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)
1 + r − δ
β1.
Further, any type with discount factor β1 has income y1 > 1. Types with discount factors less
than β2 have income equal to −T. Any type with β = β2 will have y2 ≤ 1.
Proof A necessary condition for a steady state is that






0 if y ≤ 1
¯ τ > 0 if y = 1
.
11The parameter τ simply equals ν0, and ¯ y will always equal 1.
16First, from the household’s budget constraint any type n with assets approaching the borrowing
limit must steady state income approaching −T. Thus if yn > −T,
1 = βn [1 + (1 − τy (y))(r − δ)].
Second, since government expenditures are positive by budget balance τy (y) = ¯ τ for at least
one type, implying that there are households with income greater than 1 in the steady state. The
steady state Euler equation for any such household is
1 = βn [1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)]
Given an r and a ¯ τ, this condition can only be satisﬁed for one βn. It is easy to see that this
βn = β1. If it were satisﬁed for some other βn, then
1 < β1 [1 + (1 − τy (y))(r − δ)]
which violates (3.1). Therefore
1 = β1 [1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)]
and
1 > βn [1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)], n > 1.
Note that (3.1) is satisﬁed for n > 1 when
βn ≤
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)





1 + r − δ
.
To complete the proof, we will now show that a steady state cannot exist for βn ≥
1+(1−¯ τ)(r−δ)
1+r−δ β1.




1 + r − δ
 
+ (1 − η)
 
1
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)
 
, 0 < η < 1.
Either ys ≤ 1 or ys > 1. If ys ≤ 1, then
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+ (1 − η)
 
1
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)
  
[1 + r − δ]
≥
η (1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)) + (1 − η)(1 + r − δ)
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ) ≥ η (1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)) + (1 − η)(1 + r − δ)
(1 − η)(1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)) ≥ (1 − η)(1 + r − δ)






1 + r − δ
 
+ (1 − η)
 
1
1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)
  
[1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)]
=
η [1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)] + (1 − η)(1 + r − δ)
1 + r − δ
1 + r − δ = η [1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)] + (1 − η)(1 + r − δ)
η (1 + r − δ) = η [1 + (1 − ¯ τ)(r − δ)]
which is also a contraction. Therefore ys does not exist implying that there can be no βs in a
18steady state.
Deﬁne an intermediate β type as any type n for which
β1 [1 + (1 − τ)(r − δ)]
1 + r − δ
< βn < β1.
As shown above, the existence of an intermediate β type rules out a steady state. To see this, note
that y = 1 is the the only potential steady state income value for any intermediate β type. At
y = 1, however, consumption growth must be positve because this type discounts the future less
than the market pays for deferred consumption (i.e., βn > 1
1+r−δ) so income rises. Any increase
in income discontinuously increases the marginal tax rate so that the market no longer suﬃciently
rewards this type for postponing consumption. Consumption growth will be less than one so
income will fall. If the number of intermediate β types is greater than 1, then the most patient of
them will have the largest consumption growth in the initial period and will converge the slowest
back toward an income of 1.
The wealth distribution in this case would have the most patient type holding the largest
share of wealth (possibly an extremely large share). Intermediate β types could have positive or
negative wealth depending upon their labor income. All other types have assets approaching the
natural borrowing limit. We ﬁnd that intermediate types exist in our calibrated economy, thus
the reported ﬁndings for this experiment are not from a steady state. They should be interpreted
instead as reporting features of an economy with a joint income and wealth distribution that is the
limiting distribution from the sequence of steady states associated with a sequence of ν1, where ν1
approaches inﬁnity.
In the steady state of our numerical experiment, τ = 14.5 percent. Table 5 reports the per-
centage changes in the steady state aggregates. Aggregate income rises by 203 percent while the
19capital stock increases by 266 percent. The extreme rise in these values is caused almost entirely
by the behavior of the most patient household. This household has income equal to 40,672 times
the average and wealth equal to 166,512 times the average.12 Hours increase only 11 percent, but
total labor input surges by 185 percent. The big increase in labor input is not caused by the most
patient household but rather by the highly productive among the other households. Hours for
these households rise in response to a zero tax rate, leading to large increases in labor income. To
maintain an income level below y, this additional labor income is balanced by very large negative
asset positions. With households in this economy taking such extreme positions, it is not surprising
that inequality increases signiﬁcantly. The Gini coeﬃcient of income rises by 41.4 percent to 0.7,
and the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth rises from 0.745 to nearly 1.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the consequences of altering the progressivity of the tax code in
a model with heterogenous household but no idiosyncratic risk. As we noted in the Introduction,
our results are qualitatively diﬀerent from those found in models with incomplete asset markets.
Thus, we argue that more attention must be paid to deriving the insurance opportunities available
to households, either in terms of borrowing limits or missing insurance markets. Some papers take
steps in this direction, such as Krueger and Perri (2005) or ´ Abrah´ am and Carceles-Poveda (2007),
but more work is needed. Table 7 illustrates how assumptions about the nature of income and
wealth inequality lead to diﬀerent predictions about the eﬀects of ﬂattening the tax code.
We want to point out ”progressive” tax reforms – that is, changes in the tax function that
induce more progressivity relative to the estimated U.S. tax function – would enjoy strong political
12To give some perspective to this number, the average wealth in the US is around $180,000 (inclusive of illiquid
retirement portfolios and housing). Our wealthiest household therefore has a wealth of nearly $30 billion. Currently
there are only 3 individuals on the Forbes’s billionaires list with total wealth greater than this.
20support. Carroll (2009) contains an investigation of the source for this support; it would be of
considerable interest to investigate this issue in the models that endogenize risk sharing.
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23Table 1
Experiment 1: % Change
Y K C H N
ν1 = 0.768 − − − − −
ν1 = 1.0 17.4 21.1 21.7 −11.4 16.1
ν1 = 2.0 41.8 46.8 52.2 −26.8 40.0
ν1 = 3.0 41.7 43.0 52.2 −29.4 41.3
Table 2
Exper 1: Inequality and Progressivity
Gy Gk Kakpre Kakpost
v1 = 0.768 49.4 74.5 0.045 0.045
v1 = 1.0 41.6 85.2 0.075 0.064
v1 = 2.0 28.9 92.0 0.151 0.107
v1 = 3.0 23.8 93.4 0.165 0.118
Table 3
Experiment 2: % Change
Y K C H N
ν0 = 0.258 − − − − −
ν0 = 0.27 1.3 2.7 2.0 −2.6 0.7
ν0 = 0.29 5.1 7.5 6.8 −4.6 4.2
ν0 = 0.32 10.7 14.7 13.9 −7.3 9.4
24Table 4
Exper 2: Inequality and Progressivity
Gy Gk Kakpre Kakpost
ν0 = 0.258 49.4 74.5 0.045 0.045
ν0 = 0.27 48.6 78.6 0.049 0.048
ν0 = 0.29 47.8 82.8 0.054 0.052
ν0 = 0.32 46.7 86.5 0.064 0.058
Table 5
Experiment 3: % Change
Y K C H N
ν1 = 0.768 − − − − −
v1 = ∞ 203.2 265.6 254.0 10.6 184.5
Table 6
Exper 3: Inequality and Progressivity
Gy Gk Kakpre Kakpost
ν1 = 0.768 49.4 74.5 0.045 0.045
v1 = ∞ 69.8 1.0 0.284 0.302
25Figure 1



















Flat Tax Experiments Setup Types of Risk Eﬀect on Aggregates Eﬀect on Distribution
Conessa and Krueger (2006) OLG; idiosyncratic wages, death Y,K,H,N,C,r increase Giniy,Ginik increase
01
Ventura (1999) OLG idiosyncratic wages, death Y,K,N increase, Giniy,Ginik increase
H unchanged, r decrease
Diaz-Gimenez and Pijoan-Mas (2006) OLG/dynastic idiosyncratic wages, retirement, death Y,K,H, N,C,r increase Giniy,Ginik,Ginic increase
Casta˜ neda,Diaz-Gimenez, OLG/dynastic idiosyncratic wages, retirement, death Y,K,H, N,C,r increase Giniy,Ginik,Ginic increase
and R´ ıos-Rull (1999)
2
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